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THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PHYSICIANS IN STATES WITH 
NARRATED ULTRASOUND LAWS 
Sabrina Jemail 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Is it truly possible to teach an old dog new tricks? More specifically, 
what if the old dog is the federal judiciary and the new trick is a different 
constitutional provision with which to contest state abortion laws? For 
decades, federal courts across the country have grappled with questions 
surrounding state abortion regulations, deciphering the constitutionality 
of the state’s involvement in such deeply personal, private decisions.1 The 
traditional arguments come from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause’s rights for patients.2 But recently enacted state abortion laws 
target the doctors performing these medical procedures rather than the 
patients seeking them.3 These laws require that doctors must perform a 
narrated ultrasound on the pregnant woman before performing an 
abortion.4 Specifically, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Texas all require 
the patient to hear an explanation of the ultrasound, even if she decides to 
avert her eyes of the sonogram images.5 They each also characterize the 
description of the fetus as a “medical description” that includes the size 
of the embryo, presence of cardiac activity, and location and existence of 
limbs and internal organs.6 As a result, the nature of the legal arguments 
challenging these laws has shifted. Lately, doctors are challenging the 
constitutionality of these state laws in federal court as violations of the 
First Amendment’s free speech protections because the laws impose 
verbal requirements on the doctors.7 While the Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
have upheld such laws as merely informed consent laws regulating a 
 
 1. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) 
 2. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 3. See, e.g., Ultrasound Informed Consent Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2017); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (West 2011); Act Relating to Informed Consent to an Abortion, TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 177.0122 (West 2011). 
 4.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85; TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 177.0122. 
 5. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85; TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 177.0122. 
 6. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85; TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 177.0122. 
 7. See, e.g., Nat’l Ins. Fam. & Life Adv.  v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); EMW Women’s 
Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2018); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion 
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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medical procedure, the Fourth Circuit has taken the opposite position and 
struck down such laws in violation of the doctors’ constitutionally-
protected free speech.8  
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the judicial history 
surrounding abortion regulations, including the Supreme Court’s opinion 
upholding informed consent laws that require risk and health disclosures 
before abortion procedures. Part II also discusses the split between the 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits and the Fourth Circuit. Part III of this Note 
examines the propriety of analogizing mandatory narrated ultrasound 
laws to informed consent laws and determines which circuit opinion is a 
proper interpretation of First Amendment free speech protections. Finally, 
Part IV argues in favor of the Fourth Circuit’s line of reasoning and 
discusses the implications of this legal direction. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 1973 with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe 
v. Wade, the Court has entrenched itself in the heated battle between pro-
choice and pro-life activists. Several subsequent decisions have since 
come down, but the litigation and ensuing policy implications have not 
become any less complex or controversial.9 First, this Part outlines the 
complicated history of abortion litigation in the United States. Second, it 
provides an overview of free speech litigation. Finally, this Part delves 
into the crossover of these two bodies of law by detailing the recent 
appellate decisions concerning the First Amendment rights of physicians 
who perform abortions. Although the two bodies are seemingly unrelated, 
this Part will show how abortion rights and free speech rights bleed into 
one another, as the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have demonstrated. 
A. Abortion and Due Process: A Controversial History 
For years, the fight over a woman’s right to an abortion has divided this 
nation, sparking debate in legislatures, courtrooms, and newspapers.10 In 
one of its most famous cases, Roe v. Wade,  the Supreme Court struck 
down Texas laws criminalizing abortion, determining that the right to an 
abortion was fundamental; as such, under strict scrutiny analysis, the 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C., 920 F.3d 421; Tex. 
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d 570; Stuart, 774 F.3d 238. 
 9. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; David 
Masci & Ira C. Lupu, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, PEW RES. CENTER: 
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-
rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/. 
 10. See, e.g., N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy 
in American History, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 104 (2004). 
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Court upheld a woman’s right to the procedure.11 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Blackmun clarified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment contains an implicit “right to privacy.”12 This classification 
signifies that, in order to enact a law that affects this right, the state must 
have a “compelling state interest” that is “narrowly drawn” to  serve that 
interest.13 However, he noted that a pregnant woman is not “isolated” in 
this right, indicating that the rights of the fetus are intertwined with hers. 
Therefore, states also have an interest in the fetus and pregnancy.14 
Furthermore, as the pregnancy progresses, the state interest grows in 
substantiality until it finally reaches the status of a “compelling” interest 
at the end of the woman’s first trimester.15 At this point, the state may 
impose regulations on abortion that relate to protection of maternal 
health.16 Even further, at the end of the second trimester—the point of 
fetal viability—the state’s interest is so compelling that it outweighs the 
mother’s.17  At this time, the state can regulate and even proscribe 
abortion, unless doing so harms or threatens the life of the mother.18  
In subsequent cases, this reasoning became known as “the trimester 
framework.”19 While the Supreme Court maintained the same general 
principle of striking down abortion laws under the right to privacy implicit 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the controversy 
surrounding Roe led the Court to revisit the issue in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.20 In Casey, the Court reaffirmed the 
essential holding in Roe, recognizing a woman’s right to an abortion, as 
well as the legitimacy of the state’s interest at and after the point of fetal 
viability to create restrictions on abortion procedures.21 The Court, 
however, struck down the use of the “trimester framework” and instead 
opted for a focus on viability as the measure for when the state’s interests 
outweighed those of the mother.22 Further, the Court noted that the rigid 
framework was a controversial portion of the opinion, one which 
subsequently led to courts striking down laws that did not prevent a 
woman from making the ultimate choice.23 Instead, the Court adopted the 
 
 11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).  
 12. Id. at 152, 163.  
 13. Id. at 155. 
 14. Id. at 159.  
 15. Id. at 162-63.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 164-65. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858 (1992). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 846.  
 22. Id. at 870.  
 23. Id. at 875. 
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“undue burden” standard, wherein a law only interferes with a woman’s 
right to an abortion before the point of viability when “it has the purpose 
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion of an unviable fetus.”24 While this new standard marked a new 
method for analyzing the constitutionality of abortion regulations, it still 
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and focused 
solely on the rights of the mother.  
From the clear-cut, albeit over-simplified “trimester framework” in 
Roe, to the murky and nuanced “undue burden” standard of Casey, the 
Court has worked through a series of complex and controversial 
challenges to abortion regulations. One common thread through all of 
them has been the use of the Fourteenth Amendment as the foundation of 
the constitutional challenges, and for good reason. When defending a 
person’s access to a medical procedure that many deem to be a 
fundamental right, an obvious route is to object to the denial of this right 
“without due process of law.”25  
B. Informed Consent Laws: When Free Speech Ends and the Medical 
Profession Begins 
 Subsequent laws and judicial challenges would call into play an 
entirely different provision of the Constitution: The First Amendment. 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”26 
The Supreme Court has elaborated on this sentence substantially through 
history, defining the varying levels of protection afforded to the different 
types of speech.27 For speech of the highest protection, a law must survive 
a strict scrutiny analysis, where the regulation must be “narrowly tailored” 
to serve a “compelling governmental interest.”28 An example of such a 
law is one that is “content-based.” Such content-based speech regulations 
are “presumptively invalid” unless they can overcome the strict scrutiny 
standard.29 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court struck down 
a St. Paul, Minnesota law that prohibited “fighting words that insult or 
provoke violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”30 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia even went so far as to claim that 
 
 24. Id. at 876. 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 27. Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 495, 496 (2015).  
 28. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992). 
 29. Id. at 382. 
 30. Id. at 391 (internal quotations omitted). 
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this regulation created not only content discrimination, but viewpoint 
discrimination as well, since it only prohibited fighting words against a 
minority protected class, and not those slung against the majority.31 While 
the city indeed has a duty to protect all its citizens, he wrote, “the point of 
the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in 
some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.”32 
Thus, a content-based regulation on speech, even if well-meaning, cannot 
stand in the face of the First Amendment.  
However, the Court has also determined that some forms of speech 
have less protection than others. For instance, the Constitution “accords a 
lesser protection to commercial speech,”33 or speech “related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”34 In Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N.Y., the Court 
struck down a law prohibiting advertisement of electrical utilities.35 The 
state had enacted the law to promote energy conservation.36 The Court 
implemented a four-part test used to determine whether commercial 
speech regulations violate the First Amendment: (1) the law must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted governmental 
interest must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the 
governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation must not be more 
extensive than necessary.37 Under this test, the Court struck down the 
advertising ban on the fourth prong, stating that because the regulation 
reached all promotional advertising, “regardless of the impact of the 
touted service on overall energy use,” it was more extensive than 
necessary to serve the governmental interest of energy conservation.38 
Therefore, the government can still violate the First Amendment with 
regards to lesser-protected speech, even when the law in question serves 
a substantial governmental interest.  
Finally, there are certain circumstances where the state can regulate 
specific speech, such as with informed consent laws. In Casey, the Court 
noted that the First Amendment right not to speak while in the course of 
the practice of medicine, is “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation 
by the State,” where physicians are “required to give truthful, 
nonmisleading information” relevant to the medical procedure.39 Laws 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 392. 
 33. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 34. Id. at 563. 
 35. Id. at 559, 571. 
 36. Id. at 559. 
37.Id. at 566   
 38. Id. at 569-70. 
 39. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion).  
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requiring informed consent for the medical risks of an abortion procedure 
remain constitutional “even when those consequences [of the abortion 
procedure] have no direct relation” to the health of the mother, but only 
to the fetus.40 The Court continued to discuss informed consent laws by 
exemplifying their use in other procedures, such as a kidney transplant, 
where the physician must notify the patient of risks and benefits of the 
procedure.41  
More recently, the Eighth Circuit in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota v. Rounds upheld informed consent laws 
relating to abortion procedures in light of the First Amendment and 
physicians’ freedom to not speak.42 The court referenced the plurality 
opinion from Casey in determining that compelling a physician’s speech 
in the context of providing truthful, relevant medical information is not a 
violation of the First Amendment.43 In Rounds, the law in question 
required a physician to inform a woman considering abortion, in part:  
[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being; . . . . That the pregnant woman has an 
existing relationship with that unborn human being and that the 
relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution 
and under the laws of South Dakota; . . . . That by having an abortion, 
her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with regards 
to that relationship will be terminated.44 
Despite Planned Parenthood’s arguments that the required speech 
included nonmedical and subjective information, the court found that the 
information required was “truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the 
patient’s decision to have an abortion.”45  
These compelled-speech laws not only apply to abortion providers, but 
also to pregnancy crisis centers. Recently, the Supreme Court weighed in 
on laws relating to crisis pregnancy centers, specifically ruling on a 
California law requiring such centers inform patients of contraception and 
abortion options, as well as their licensing status.46 In NIFLA v. Becerra, 
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the California law 
violated the First Amendment rights of the crisis pregnancy centers 
beholden to these laws.47 Denying the state’s argument that such laws 
were no different from informed consent laws, the Court noted that the 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 883. 
 42. See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 43. Id. at 733-34.  
 44. Id. at 719. 
 45. Id. at 738-39. 
 46. See Nat’l Ins. Fam. & Life Adv. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 47. Id. at 2378.  
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information requirements had nothing to do with a medical procedure or 
its associated risks.48  The Court differentiated the California law to those 
upheld in Casey, noting that the latter were clearly informed consent laws 
and only required the doctor to notify the patient of materials available; 
whereas the California notices did not “facilitate informed consent at all” 
and could in no way be analogous to informed consent laws.49 Therefore, 
the plurality opinion in Casey that supported compelled speech 
regulations in the context of informed consent laws was not analogous to 
the California lawsuit involving nonmedical notices.50   
In fact, the Court extended the discussion of the California laws by 
describing the dangers of regulating professional medical speech beyond 
what is necessary to provide a patient with informed consent. Justice 
Thomas emphasized that “regulating the content of professionals’ speech 
‘pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a 
legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or 
information.’”51 In fact, the Court claimed that it has not found a valid 
reason to treat “professional speech as a unique category that is exempt 
from ordinary First Amendment principles.”52 So even when applying an 
intermediate scrutiny test, the Court determined that, while the law may 
serve the state’s substantial interest in providing family-planning 
information to low-income women, the requirement that the law imposes 
on crisis centers is not “sufficiently drawn to achieve [that interest].”53  
Regardless of what the Supreme Court has ruled concerning compelled 
information laws, the Court has not ruled on how such professional 
speech regulations apply specifically to narrated ultrasound laws, where 
a physician must perform an ultrasound and describe in detail the fetus to 
a patient contemplating abortion.54 While an ultrasound is not medically 
necessary for an abortion, the laws nevertheless require the physician to 
perform one, even if the woman objects.55 The Ultrasound Informed 
Consent Act in Kentucky, the Women’s Right to Know Act in North 
Carolina, and the Act Relating to Informed Consent to an Abortion in 
Texas are the ultrasound laws that physicians in those respective states 
 
 48. Id. at 2376; These notices specifically related to clinics that promoted pregnancy and childbirth 
and discouraged women from seeking abortions. The law required that those clinics with licenses must 
disclose that women did have an option to seek an abortion elsewhere, while those without licenses must 
disclose that they were, in fact, unlicensed. 
 49. Id. at 2373.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 2374 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Forced Ultrasound Laws, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., 
https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/issue/forced-ultrasound-laws/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 
 55. Id.  
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challenged on First Amendment grounds.56 Currently, thirteen states have 
narrated ultrasound laws, but only Kentucky, North Carolina, and Texas 
have had constitutional challenges to acts at the appellate level.57 
The Supreme Court has a long history of ruling on First Amendment 
challenges and has developed separate standards of review for analyzing 
laws that implicate speech, either by prohibition or compulsion.58 Even 
within the context of the abortion debate, the Court has held that certain 
compelled speech regulations are constitutional when they require 
disclosures of “truthful, non-misleading and relevant” information.59 This 
reasoning guided the Eighth Circuit in upholding a law that required 
disclosure for abortion providers, since the information required was, as 
the opinion stated, “truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the patient’s 
decision to have an abortion.”60 Most recently, however, the Court has 
shown that not all required disclosures fall into the First Amendment-
exempted category of “informed consent.”61 Rather, when the law in 
question fails to facilitate informed consent, as did the law in NIFLA, such 
a regulation is a content-based compelled speech regulation which courts 
must strike down as unconstitutional.62 
C. Just Another Informed Consent Law: The Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ 
Stance 
The Fifth Circuit has for years addressed the constitutionality of 
narrated ultrasound laws, creating persuasive authority for other circuits. 
63 In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the Texas Act Relating to Informed Consent to an 
Abortion and determined that the law, in its compelling of physician 
speech, did not violate the physician’s First Amendment rights.64 In 
coming to this conclusion, the court applied the principles of Casey’s 
plurality, noting that the ultrasound description was the “epitome of 
 
 56. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727(d), (e) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)-(4) 
(West 2011); H.B. 15 (a)(4)(C), 82nd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 57. Forced Ultrasound Laws, supra note 55; see also, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. 
Beshear, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2018); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 
F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014); supra note 7. 
 58. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F.C.C, 512 
U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 59. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 60. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 738 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 61. Nat’l Ins. Fam. & Life Adv. v. Becerra,138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018). 
 62. Id. 
 63. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 64. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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truthful, non-misleading information.”65 While perhaps more graphic and 
scientifically current than the informed consent verbiage upheld in Casey, 
the court nonetheless found the two disclosures to be analogous.66 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court made clear in Casey that information 
about fetal development is “relevant” to the woman’s decision, making 
disclosures about the fetus necessary in order to receive informed consent 
from the patient seeking an abortion.67  
In this way, the Fifth Circuit analogized the Texas ultrasound law to 
any traditional informed consent law required before a physician may 
perform a medical procedure. Because this law is necessary in the 
regulation of the medical profession, it does not violate the doctor’s First 
Amendment rights to not speak.68 Furthermore, the court found that to 
make a First Amendment argument against theses informed consent laws 
ignores the “balance Casey struck between women’s rights and the states’ 
prerogatives.”69 In making this comment, the court essentially dismissed 
the First Amendment challenge altogether with no level of scrutiny. 
Rather, the Fifth Circuit found that because the law was so similar to the 
one upheld in Casey, a First Amendment challenge would “belabor the 
obvious and conceded point” from Casey, which “rejected any such clash 
of [First Amendment] rights in the context of informed consent.”70 
The Sixth Circuit also found Casey to be instructive in its decision 
upholding Kentucky’s mandatory narrated ultrasound law in EMW 
Women’s Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Beshear.71 Quoting Casey’s plurality 
opinion, the court emphasized that laws requiring physicians provide 
“truthful, non-misleading information” is necessary to informed 
consent.72 Further, the Sixth Circuit wrote this opinion in light of the 
recent Supreme Court decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, which it also found 
to be instructive as to the First Amendment implications of informed 
consent laws.73 Specifically, the court noted that both Casey and NIFLA 
recognized that “heightened scrutiny does not apply to incidental 
regulation of professional speech that is part of the practice of medicine,” 
and that such regulation “includes mandated informed-consent 
requirements.”74 Thus, the Sixth Circuit established that under a First 
 
 65. Id. at 578. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992)). 
 68. Id. at 577. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 72. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882). 
 73. Id. at 429 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-84; Nat’l Ins. Fam. & Life Adv. v. Becerra, , 138 S. 
Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018)). 
 74. Id. 
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Amendment challenge, the court will not apply heightened scrutiny to an 
informed consent law, even one relating to abortion, as long as it satisfies 
three requirements: (1) it relates to a medical procedure; (2) it is truthful 
and not misleading information; and (3) it is relevant to the patient’s 
decision whether to have the procedure.75 In applying this test to the law 
in question, the court found that the Kentucky law met all three 
requirements; it was therefore analogous to the informed consent laws 
previously upheld in Casey and did not require a heightened scrutiny 
analysis as to the free speech implications of the physician.76 
Interestingly, in an opinion piece for The Washington Post, law 
professor Ronald Krotoszynski Jr. pointed out the glaring hypocrisy in the 
Court’s decision not to review the Sixth Circuit’s EMW v. Beshear case 
despite granting certiorari to the analogous, although ideologically 
flipped, case in NIFLA.77 In the piece, Krotoszynski described how Justice 
Thomas emphasized that the California law imposed a “government-
scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement” in violation of the 
speaker’s First Amendment rights.78 The article then stated that such an 
imposition is “precisely” what Kentucky’s narrated ultrasound abortion 
law does; the only difference is that the California law furthered the 
state’s pro-choice preference, while the Kentucky law furthered its own 
pro-life stance.79  Furthermore, the author explained the negative 
implications of the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari to the Sixth Circuit’s 
case, namely that allowing the Sixth Circuit’s decision to stand opens the 
door for other states to enact similarly unconstitutional laws under the 
illusion that these regulations are “informed consent” laws.80 For Mr. 
Krotoszynski, the most troubling part of the Court’s decision is that the 
Court has provided greater leniency in speech for non-medical personnel 
providing advice under the pretense that they are physicians, while 
licensed physicians cannot provide their own professional medical advice 
without the state’s interference of its own pro-life message.81   
In a response letter to this opinion piece, the vice president of legal 
affairs at NIFLA, Anne O’Connor, ignored one of the central tenants of 
Mr. Krotoszynski’s argument by simply stating that the Kentucky 
narrated ultrasound law is merely an informed consent law—a type of law 
 
 75. Id. at 428. 
 76. Id. at 429. 
 77. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., The Supreme Court Gives Free Speech to Fake Doctors, But Not 
Real Ones, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2019, 6:11 PM), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
supreme-court-gives-free-speech-to-fake-doctors-but-not-real-ones/2019/12/11/2c4f4bc8-1c27-11ea-
8d58-5ac3600967a1_story.html. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
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which the Court has upheld for years.82 As such, it is inherently different 
from the compelled speech regulation at issue in NIFLA.83 But had Ms. 
O’Connor or the Sixth Circuit in its decision in EMW v. Beshear looked 
deeper into the law and the Court’s opinion in NIFLA, they could see that 
while an informed consent law is indeed a constitutional imposition on a 
physician’s speech, such a law only relates to those disclosures that 
“directly relate to the medical risks and benefits of the procedure,” which 
a medically-unnecessary narrated ultrasound does not.84  
Together, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits both upheld the Texas and 
Kentucky narrated ultrasound laws, respectively, as types of informed 
consent laws, which the Court has upheld before—most notably in 
Casey.85 The Fifth Circuit essentially ignored the First Amendment 
challenge to the law by refusing to assign a level of scrutiny under which 
to analyze it, instead opting to hold that, as an informed consent law, it 
simply does not violate the speaker’s First Amendment rights.86 
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit applied a three-prong test to determine that 
this type of informed consent law does not require any heightened 
scrutiny.87  
D. The Split Arises: The Fourth Circuit’s Stance 
In 2014, the Fourth Circuit considered the First Amendment rights of 
physicians under North Carolina’s narrated ultrasound law in Stuart v. 
Camnitz.88 The law, known as the Women’s Right to Know Act, requires 
that physicians “describe the fetus in detail,” including the presence of 
limbs and organs, and provides an exception to these requirements only 
for medical emergencies.89 First, the court determined which level of 
scrutiny was appropriate for its analysis of this First Amendment 
challenge.90 Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit found 
that the law was a content-based regulation and thus must satisfy at least 
an intermediate level of scrutiny to survive.91 In reaching this conclusion, 
 
          82. Anne O’Connor, Women Deserve a “Window into the Womb” through Mandatory Ultrasound,                                             
WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2019, 5:28 PM), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/women-deserve-a-
window-into-the-womb-through-mandatory-ultrasound/2019/12/20/513d7b22-2275-11ea-b034-
de7dc2b5199b_story.html. 
          83. Id. 
 84. Krotoszynski, supra note 78. 
 85. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2012); 
EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 86. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577. 
 87. EMW v. Beshear, 920 F.3d at 428-29. 
 88. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (West 2011). 
 89. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243.  
 90. Id. at 244-45. 
 91. Id. at 245. 
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the court emphasized that, first and foremost, the First Amendment 
protects not only against prohibitions of speech, but also against 
regulations that require speech.92 Further, the law at hand compelling 
physician speech, like all regulations compelling speech, is “by its very 
nature content-based, because it requires the speaker to change the content 
of his speech or even to say something where he would otherwise be 
silent.”93 Moreover, this compelled speech is “ideological,” and while the 
Fifth Circuit may have been correct in asserting that the required 
disclosures are factual, the veracity of the statements “does not divorce 
the speech from its moral or ideological implications.”94 Specifically, the 
court noted that while not every medical description of a fetus may be 
ideological speech, this specific script “promotes a pro-life message,” 
emphasizing the moral and political effects of the speech, and thus its 
content-based nature.95 
While content-based regulations typically must survive strict scrutiny, 
the state asserted that the law should receive a rational basis standard of 
review since it is a law regulating the practice of medicine.96 The court 
stated that physicians do not “abandon their First Amendment rights” 
when they begin practicing.97 Instead, the court pointed to the sliding 
“continuum” for determining the level of scrutiny for professional 
regulations, where “public dialogue” is on one end and “professional 
conduct” is on the other.98 This narrated ultrasound law, the court said, 
falls in the middle of the continuum , as it requires physicians to both act 
and speak.99 Furthermore, because the practice of medicine is a fairly self-
regulated profession, the state’s interest in regulating it has less potency 
than it does for other, less-regulated professions.100 This, combined with 
the fact that the speech is content-based, led the court to determine that it 
must apply intermediate scrutiny to the law.101 
The Fourth Circuit then went on to compare its decision here with the 
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lakey.102 The court stated that 
the Lakey court reached too far in its comparison to and reliance on 
Casey.103 The Fourth Circuit instead maintained that the single paragraph 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 246 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 247.  
 98. Id. at 248 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 248-49.  
 103. Id. 
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in the Casey opinion does not provide the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
abortion regulations controlling physicians’ speech.104  Further, according 
to the Fourth Circuit, the plurality opinion in Casey did not assert that all 
medical speech regulations should receive rational basis review.105 
Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on 
Casey to determine the level of scrutiny required for the narrated 
ultrasound laws was inappropriate.106  
The Fourth Circuit proceeded to analyze the law under the appropriate 
intermediate scrutiny level, stating that the state’s interest is “important,” 
and so the means for achieving it must be drawn to that interest and 
“proportional to the burden placed on the physician’s speech.”107  The 
Supreme Court has long held that states do have an important interest in 
both the health of the mother and in the promotion of life.108 The North 
Carolina law, however, did not further the state’s interest in the mother’s 
health; in fact, the court explicitly noted that the other informed consent 
laws which are in the interest of the mother’s health are not at issue in 
this case, emphasizing that informed consent laws were completely 
separate from the law in question.109 These laws, like informed consent 
laws for all other medical procedures, require the physician to notify the 
patient of the risks and benefits of the abortion procedure and are 
important for promoting the rights of patients.110   
While the state contended that the narrated ultrasound law was no 
different than other such consent laws, the court reiterated that these 
narrated ultrasound laws do not resemble any traditional informed 
consent laws, which allow a patient to make a well-informed decision 
about a medical procedure. The Fourth Circuit noted that, in Casey, the 
informed consent law that the Court upheld sounded similar to other 
informed consent laws, with the added modification that the woman could 
receive a state-published pamphlet describing the fetus if she wished.111 
Meanwhile, this North Carolina law compels the physician to give that 
information to the patient in real time, whether she wants to receive it or 
not.112 The court characterized this speech as “coercive,” underscoring its 
inherent differences from the law that the Court in Casey upheld, which 
only required the doctor to inform the patient of the available pamphlet.113  
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 249. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 251. 
 108. Id. at 250-51. 
 109. Id. at 244. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 253.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
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Regarding the state’s interest in promoting life, while the state may 
certainly have a policy preference against abortion, it cannot 
“commandeer” the physician’s relationship with the patient to “compel” 
the physician to express the state’s preference to the patient.114 Such 
compulsion is no longer the state’s encouragement, but a lecture, through 
the mouthpiece of a doctor.115 Therefore, the state’s means in furthering 
its interests in the patient and fetus are not proportional to the burden that 
the law imposes on the physician.116 Moreover, the law does not resemble 
any sort of informed consent law that courts traditionally uphold to 
promote state interests; even more, it imposed “an extraordinary burden 
on [the physician’s] expressive rights.”117 Indeed, this law is an example 
of a regulation compelling ideological speech. These types of laws “pose 
the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate 
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or 
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”118 
E. Putting It All Together 
While the Supreme Court has a long history of adjudicating abortion 
law cases, the cases have usually revolved around the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of women seeking abortions. Only recently have the 
First Amendment rights of physicians performing these abortions come 
into play in the federal judiciary. This new take on abortion rights 
litigation is the result of narrated ultrasound laws. While the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits see these as an extension of long-upheld informed consent 
laws, the Fourth Circuit has distinguished these laws as a way for the state 
to use doctors as its mouthpiece on a controversial moral issue. Although 
the Supreme Court has recently ruled on compelled speech laws in 
relation to pregnancy crisis centers in NIFLA v. Becerra, it has not 
addressed the compelled speech laws for abortion providers. Thus, there 
is an unresolved circuit split regarding these narrated ultrasound laws.  
III. DISCUSSION 
The aforementioned circuit split presents an interesting dilemma for 
the legal field, pitting free speech rights against the state’s interests in 
protecting life and providing patients with adequate medical information. 
This Part address whether such narrated ultrasound laws are indeed 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 254. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 255 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys.. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
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informed consent laws where the state’s interests would outweigh the 
physician’s free speech rights, arguing that these laws go beyond 
informed consent. Further, this Part demonstrates how the Court’s most 
recent decision in NIFLA v. Becerra is instructive for the narrated 
ultrasound lawsuits as the compelled speech required by the laws at issue 
in NIFLA is analogous to the compelled speech that the narrated 
ultrasound laws demand. Finally, this Part argues that, because of these 
factors, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning provides the argument most in line 
with the First Amendment and should thus be used in the adjudication of 
subsequent narrated ultrasound lawsuits.  
A. Informed Consent or Simply Information? 
While the Fourth Circuit clearly separates narrated ultrasound laws 
from the informed consent laws that already exist in North Carolina, the 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits took the opposite approach when analyzing their 
respective narrated ultrasound lawsuits.119 Although these ultrasound 
laws have titles that include an iteration of “informed consent,” they are 
actually codified in a different section from their states’ informed consent 
laws for abortions.120 The portions of the states’ code that enforce 
informed consent for abortions require a description of the risks and 
benefits of the procedure, just as the laws governing disclosures for other 
medical procedures do.121 Therefore, the ultrasounds required by law are 
not medically equivalent to the informed consent that a patient typically 
receives prior to an abortion or any other surgery.122 The ultrasound laws 
present distinct legal questions from the legal questions in cases with 
traditional informed consent laws.123 While these prior informed consent 
laws can serve as guidance, the distinct difference between traditional 
informed consent laws and narrated ultrasound laws, evinced by each 
state’s code, indicates that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ heavy reliance on 
informed consent lawsuits in their decisions could be distortive. The 
following Subsection will discuss in detail the implications of narrated 
ultrasound laws and whether they are similar enough to informed consent 
so as to be medically relevant and within the scope of constitutional state 
regulation. 
 
 119. Id. at 251; Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 578 (5th 
Cir. 2012); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 120. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (West 2011); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0122 (West 2019). 
 121. Stuart, 774 F.3d 238; Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578; EMW v. Beshear, 920 F.3d at428; see also KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 177.012. 
 122. See supra note 122.  
 123. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); Planned Parenthood v. 
Rounds, 530 F.3d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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B. NIFLA: Relevant, Analogous, Controlling 
While Casey provided much guidance to the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in 
their respective narrated ultrasound lawsuits, the more recent 2018 
Supreme Court decision of NIFLA v. Becerra regarding state abortion 
laws is more relevant to the type of compelled speech regulation in 
question.124 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, emphasized that the 
notice at issue was not an “informed consent” law and therefore that the 
plurality opinion in Casey was not relevant to the discussion of this 
present regulation.125 The Sixth Circuit in EMW v. Beshear interpreted 
this point, however, to mean that the California law was unlike both the 
informed consent law in Casey as well as the Kentucky narrated 
ultrasound law. 126 Instead, the Sixth Circuit reiterated that the 
Pennsylvania law in Casey and the Kentucky law presented the same legal 
question and rendered the NIFLA opinion irrelevant to the discussion.127  
This characterization, while convenient for the Sixth Circuit’s ultimate 
decision, is not accurate. As stated earlier in this Note, Kentucky already 
has informed consent laws relating to abortion procedures located in a 
separate section of its code.128 The Ultrasound Informed Consent Act, and 
the regulations from these other narrated ultrasound lawsuits, do not relate 
to risks and benefits of an abortion or other information that is relevant to 
the medical procedure itself; rather, they only discuss details of the 
fetus.129 In fact, an ultrasound before an abortion, while helpful for dating 
the pregnancy, is not medically necessary for the procedure itself.130  The 
NIFLA opinion noted that the notice requirements of the California 
disclosure law provided “no information about the risks or benefits” of 
any pregnancy-related procedure.131 These narrated ultrasound laws 
“[impose] a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement” 
that is severed completely from the states’ “informational interest.”132  
Considering the lack of medical necessity for the ultrasounds and the 
similarity between the ultrasound laws and the California notice law, 
these narrated ultrasound laws are not informed consent laws, as the Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits contend, but rather are more akin to the law in NIFLA. 
 
 124. Nat’l Ins. Fam. & Life Adv. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 125. Id. at 2373.  
 126. EMW v. Beshear, 920 F.3d at 429. 
 127. Id. 
 128. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2017). 
 129. See, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727(d), (e) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)-
(4) (West 2011); H.B. 15 (a)(4)(C), 82nd Leg. Reg. Sess.(Tex. 2011).  
 130. Jen Russo, M.D., Mandated Ultrasound Prior to Abortion, 16 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. 
ASS’N J. ETHICS 240, 241 (2014). 
 131. Nat’l Ins. Fam. & Life Adv., 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018). 
 132. Id. at 2377.  
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Therefore, NIFLA should be instructive in these and future narrated 
ultrasound lawsuits. 
Specifically, courts should heed Justice Thomas’ poignant remarks 
regarding professional speech and its lack of special categorization in 
terms of First Amendment protections.133 The Court was clear in NIFLA 
that it has never recognized such a category of speech, and that just 
because speech is uttered by “professionals” does not make it unprotected 
nor immune to a strict scrutiny review as a content-based regulation.134 
Once again the Court emphasized that compelled speech requirements are 
by nature content-based restrictions, and are subject to strict scrutiny.135 
The majority noted that even when applying intermediate scrutiny to the 
laws, since the law was somewhat commercial in nature, the laws fell 
significantly short of achieving the state’s informational goals because the 
notices were wholly unrelated to “the risks and benefits.”136 Similarly, if 
the states in the narrated ultrasound lawsuits have a goal to provide 
pregnant patients with informed consent of the risks and benefits of a 
procedure, then requiring physicians to describe an ultrasound of the fetus 
is entirely unrelated to the procedure. This government-written script does 
not facilitate informed consent in any way. As such, it is not a narrowly-
drawn method to achieve the states’ apparent interest in providing 
information about the procedure.   
While the NIFLA Court took a fairly conservative position, striking 
down a law that would have encouraged abortions, the reasoning actually 
runs both ways. In reference to the narrated ultrasound lawsuits, the 
majority made clear that it did not call into question “health and safety 
warnings . . . or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures”; but as 
long as the regulated, compelled speech does not relate to the specific 
medical procedure at hand, the speech requirement “chill[s]” the 
physician’s First Amendment rights.137 It is clear that a regulation 
requiring a doctor to both perform and narrate medically unnecessary 
ultrasounds before performing an abortion is not only unrelated to a health 
or safety warning, but is also quite the opposite of “uncontroversial.”138 
Therefore, unlike the Fifth and Sixth Circuits held, these narrated 
ultrasound laws are not informed consent. Rather, they are burdensome 
requirements imposed on physicians that alter their speech and, thus, 
violate their constitutional rights. 
A required disclosure does not automatically become an informed 
 
 133. See infra Part-IIB 
 134. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at2371-72. 
 135. Id. at 2371. 
 136. Id. at 2375. 
 137. Id. at 2376, 2378. 
     138.   See id.  
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consent disclosure just because it must precede the medical procedure at 
hand. Rather, the disclosure is only informed consent if the patient must 
hear it to gain a full understanding of the procedure’s risks. Notably, a 
state’s preference or moral stance on the procedure is not related to the 
risks and benefits of the procedure, even if it is one as controversial as 
abortion. Certainly, the Court did not intend to create such a hypocritical 
disparity between two similar compelled speech regulations. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that the Court did not feel the need to restate what it had 
already made clear in NIFLA: medical providers cannot be subject to 
compelled speech regulations that are unrelated to “the risks and benefits” 
of the procedure and, thus, disconnected from the informational interests 
that guide the state’s informed consent laws.139 Such compelled speech 
laws, whether in favor of a pro-choice or pro-life stance, fail even 
intermediate scrutiny. 
D. Narrated Ultrasound Laws: When the Physician Becomes the State’s 
Mouthpiece 
Putting aside the state’s interest in the health of the mother and only 
considering its significant interest in protecting human life, the method 
for achieving this interest through narrated ultrasound laws is still much 
too broad. In Casey, the Court upheld a law that required the physicians 
to merely tell a patient about a state pamphlet that promoted a pro-life 
message. In the narrated ultrasound laws, however, the physicians must 
actually speak the state’s pro-life message themselves. As the Fourth 
Circuit noted, this requirement not only goes beyond informed consent, 
but actually compels “ideological speech,” forcing the physician to 
express the state’s view on this controversial matter, as the state’s 
“mouthpiece.”140  
Meanwhile, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ contention that the narrated 
ultrasound only provides “truthful, non-misleading information” like 
other informed consent laws and like the pamphlet law in Casey is a gross 
simplification.141 First, these Circuits’ categorizations, like that of the vice 
president of NIFLA, ignore the obvious disconnection that a narrated 
ultrasound has from any sort of medically relevant informed consent 
disclosure. Beyond this plain distinction between the two laws, this 
simplification patently ignores the deeply controversial moral 
implications of the state’s pro-life message inherent in the script and the 
 
 139. Id.at 2375. 
 140. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253-54 (4th Cir. 2014) 
 141. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2018); Tex. 
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 2012); See also Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
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visual and audio requirements of the law. While a state is free to have a 
stance on abortion, it is not free to violate the expressive rights of a private 
citizen to promote that message. The state may provide materials that 
express its message, whether it be pro-life or pro-choice, as was the case 
in NIFLA, but it cannot compel and alter the speech of an individual who 
otherwise would not express such a sentiment. This rings especially true 
when the speaker is a medical professional and the speech is wholly 
unrelated to the medical procedure at hand. Therefore, as the Court did in 
NIFLA, courts should construe narrated ultrasound laws, and all other 
laws which compel physicians to disclose unrelated, state-sponsored 
information, as content-based regulations that must pass a heightened 
scrutiny to survive.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Fourth Circuit decided its narrated ultrasound lawsuit 
before the NIFLA decision  was issued, its Stuart decision was correct in 
striking down the narrated ultrasound law because it violated physicians’ 
First Amendment rights.  In light of the NIFLA decision, courts across the 
country now have an obligation to apply heightened scrutiny to compelled 
speech regulations in the context of abortion procedures. Courts must look 
to the interests the state alleges and determine whether the law is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that interest. In narrated ultrasound lawsuits, where the 
laws are unrelated to any health or safety warnings and instead force the 
doctor to promote a highly controversial ideological message, the laws 
will not survive heightened scrutiny. There is no question that such speech 
and act requirements violate the First Amendment rights of the doctors 
who must adhere to them. Furthermore, allowing these laws to stand not 
only infringes the doctors’ free speech, but also endangers patients by 
burdening their access to a medical procedure and bombarding them with 
unnecessary information. Upholding these compelled speech laws now 
paves the way for future legislation  compelling physician speech wholly 
unrelated to the medical procedure at hand. Permitting more of these 
compelled speech laws could overwhelm patients at a time when they are 
already subjected to massive amounts of information—most of which is 
medically unnecessary. Moreover, such lenient restrictions on the 
disclosures would certainly condone, if not encourage, that the patient 
could receive misleading or even false information. In the interest of 
protecting doctors’ First Amendment rights and patients’ health and 
informed consent rights, courts should strike down such narrated 
ultrasound laws that stretch far beyond medically necessary into 
ideologically forceful and burdensome. 
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